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SUMMARY OF A STATEMENT OF
THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES
ON LAWYERS' ETHICAL PROBLEMS
F. B. MAC KINNON*

The effect of religious principles upon the attitude of lawyers toward
their professional responsibilities shows itself in their treatment of a
wide range of ethical problems. To help in appraising this effect, these
problems can be arranged in three general, overlapping categories:
1. Problems whose solution, the lawyer believes, is governed by a
religious code of conduct based upon divine law or church doctrine.
2. Problems which arise because of the conflict which the lawyer
sees between the requirements of divine justice and the requirements

of his role in the administration of a man-made system of laws.

3. Problems which arise because of the difference between the character of the professional relationship between lawyer and client and
the more intimate relationship between individuals required by his
religious principles.
1. One obvious way to examine the effect of religious principles upon
lawyers' ethical problems is to investigate the extent to which they
provide positive answers to his specific questions. If the lawyer is
guided by a detailed religious code of conduct which is relevant to
his professional activities, he will, of course, find answers for his
ethical problems within his religion.
For example, Roman Catholic canon law and church doctrine may
guide the Catholic lawyer in his handling of otherwise troublesome
situations. Illustrations of this type of guidance may be found in two
series of lectures given to the Catholic Lawyers Guild of Chicago by
officers of the Catholic church. One series, entitled Canon Law on
Civil Action in Marriage Problems, presents a definite pattern of conduct to follow in divorce and separation cases. Many of his worries
concerning his own moral responsibility in this troublesome area are
solved for him by rules laid down by the church. Similarly, in a series
on The Natural Law and the Legal Profession, lawyers in the Guild
were given assistance, more or less detailed, based upon religious
principles, for guidance in professional work on such matters as sterilization, housing contracts and leases which forbid children, birth control, alienation of affections, abortion, euthanasia, religious education,
bankruptcy, anti-trust suits, the plea of the statute of limitation, wage
contracts and strikes and the responsibility of the buyer to tell the
seller of hidden values in the object of the purchase.
* Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School.
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Most lawyers, including Catholics, apparently believe that their
religious faith provides detailed rules for professional conduct in
specific situations infrequently, if at all.
Some lawyers derive assistance in the solution of their ethical problems from religious principles of a different degree of specificity. Many
give a religious basis to such guiding principles as "loyalty" and "trust."
For example, followers of the Buchmanite movement adopt as guiding
principles the four absolutes of honesty, purity, unselfishness and love.1
Although the rule of absolute honesty may not solve particular
ethical problems entirely, it may advance their solution by its tendency
to eliminate an element which is particularly troublesome to lawyers
in many situations.
Divine guidance of an even more general sort is relied upon by
lawyers to the extent that they give a religious origin to the "conscience" and "moral law" which they call upon in the solution of many of
their difficult ethical problems. For example, "He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client. '2 "The client cannot be made the
keeper of the lawyer's conscience in professional matters. ' 3 "[H]e advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client
when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the
client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest prin'4
ciples of moral law."
As in the analysis of other principles which motivate lawyers, it is
difficult to isolate the particular effect on his actions caused by religious
beliefs. However, they probably form a major but unexpressed factor
in the decision of many lawyers not to take particular cases, and to
stay entirely out of certain fields, for example, divorce practice, criminal practice, and the collection of overdue debts, in which the lawyers
might be called upon to face a conflict between professional duties
and religious beliefs which they hold concerning the marriage contract,
certain crimes, and usury.
A lawyer's faith in a religious standard of conduct may create ethical
problems. for him, as well as solve them. This is illustrated by the
dilemma of a lawyer with a belief in the religious values of marriage
who is asked for advice on divorce. Should he take an objective,
legalistic view and handle it mechanically like other attorneys, should
he act in accordance with his religious beliefs or should he refer the
client to non-lawyer advisers in this field?
1. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, N.Y.U. 10TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1067
2. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
(1952).

3. Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
4. Canon 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
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As another example, should the lawyer who believes that debts
should be payed, as a matter of conscience, plead the statute of limitations for a client who clearly owes the money? If he refuses to do so,
is he being unethical by failing to give the client the benefit of this
defense?
2. For most lawyers religious principles apparently do not offer
directly applicable standards of conduct, either in terms of solutions
for particular problems such as that of divorce or in terms of absolutely
constant rules of behavior such as that of honesty. Like most people
in our society they believe that divine law has no direct relevance to
our everyday problems-that interpretations of divine law may be relevant to particular problems at particular times but have no lasting
application. For lawyers in this group, religious principles serve in a
more indirect way as an aid to the solution of their ethical problems,
and as a source of these problems.
A common analysis of the relation between religious principles and
the practice of law develops along the following lines ("justice" unless otherwise qualified will be used to mean divine justice; "law" to
mean our man-made system of laws.): If divine justice cannot be obtained by the direct application of revealed divine law, it must be
approached through some man-made system of dispensing justice. Because of man's innate imperfections he cannot act in a way consistent
with the requirements of divine justice. In order to approach this
perfection he seeks justice by setting up a legal system adapted to the
requirements of this imperfect world.
By the very nature of such an institution, our legal system approaches the problem of justice on an impersonal basis. "Law of necessity generalizes, it embraces in one rule a multiplicity of cases. There
can be no such thing as a law which discriminates the individual, which
is entirely fitted to the individual, which would admit as valid the
uniqueness of the individual, for that would invalidate the very conception of law."'5 Also, the legal system is unable to dispense perfect
justice because it treats all as bound by rules laid down in advance,
following the principle of the value of predictability.
Because individuals differ essentially one from another and because their acts form patterns which do not conform to predictions,
these inherent fallibilities in our legal system preclude perfect justice.
Also, there is the further addition of the injustices due to the imperfect
character of our lawmakers-executives, legislators and judges.
The implication of this argument for the lawyer is that he is participating in a legal system which is designed to approach justice in all
cases as nearly as possible, but that the ideal will never be attained
because of imperfections in man and the system which he has created.
5. BRUNNER, JUSTICE IN THE SOCIAL ORDER (1945).
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Although the system is the best hope for the generality of cases, the
lawyer must be aware that in particular instances it will yield injustice for the individual.
In addition to the character of the legal system itself, the lawyer is
concerned with the requirements of his particular role in that system.
If the lawyer were in a position of complete authority in the system,
he might believe it possible to interrupt its operation so as to achieve
justice in the unusual cases--"to play God." However, he recognizes
that he does not have that power, and that such power in his or anyone's hands would be undesirable. The lawyer's traditional role in the
legal system is a specialized one which excludes him from any possibility of control over the system itself.
In the adversary system the function of the lawyer is to present, as
an advocate, his client's case in the most forceful manner possible,
within certain limits, so that the full value of the client's position can
be appreciated by the deciding tribunal-the judge and the jury. The
opposing advocate will call attention to the weaknesses in his case and
the arguments for the other side. The decision of the tribunal will be
based upon these conflicting efforts. This system has been worked out
over the centuries and seems to be the one most likely to approach
justice in most cases. However, in order for it to function, the lawyer
must play a specialized role which does not permit him to pass upon
the justice of the case. The lawyer participating in a dispute cannot,
himself, see to it that justice is done.
This institutionalized role of the lawyer removes him two steps from
justice. In the first place, he realizes that he must seek to achieve
justice within the existing legal system. In the second place, he
realizes that in order to make the system function properly in general
he must confine himself to the role of the advocate. It would be inconsistent with his role and would destroy the merits of the system
if he were to take it upon himself to point out his client's faults, or to
say himself what the legally just result should be. In addition, he
must keep in mind that his arguments must be limited to those which
are legally relevant and admissible in court, although, under this limitation, he may believe he cannot "do justice" to the true merits of
his client's cause.
It is in connection with these aspects of the lawyer's function that
Mr. Curtis has described the role of the advocate as being more closely
akin to the Stoic philosophy than the Christian philosophy. In discussing the detachment which the lawyer must have in order to give the
client good legal advice he states: "There is authority for such detachment. It is not Christian. Nor is the practice of law a characteristically
Christian pursuit. The practice of law is vicarious, not altruistic, and
the lawyer must go back of Christianity to Stoicism to the vicarious
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detachment which will permit him to serve his client. ' 6
To the extent that they must develop an unchristian detachment
their role must worry Christian lawyers. However, many lawyers believe that the performance of their limited role is more likely to contribute to divine justice in our complex modern society than any attempt on their own part to assess directly the true worth of their
client's case, and, therefore, that their role is compatible with Christian philosophy.
Curtis quotes a passage from Lecky's The Map of Life, which defines
the problem for the advocate: "[A]t best there must be many things
in the profession from which a very sensitive conscience would recoil,
and things must be said and done which can hardly be justified except
on the ground that the existence of this profession and the prescribed
methods of its action are in the long run indispensible to the honest
'7
administration of justice."
Apparently some men are unable to accept this reconciliation of the
advocate's role and religious teaching. For that reason they leave the
study and practice of law because they believe it to be an occupation
which is incompatible with their religious principles. Other lawyers
who worry about the moral implications of the advocate's function
solve their problems by restricting themselves to fields of practice in
the law, such as estates and trusts, where they are rarely involved in
litigation or other disputes of an adversary nature.
Within the bounds of the advocate's role in the system there remains
considerable latitude for him in the manner of the performance of his
official duties. The advocate has the great power of being able to
present his client's case as he sees fit. The proper performance of the
role depends to a great extent upon the lawyer's own self restraint.
If he does not feel bound by certain moral standards to confine himself
to the proper exercise of his role, the legal system will not work. The
lawyer himself cannot see that justice is done but the legal system
which attempts to achieve justice depends completely upon his proper
performance of his role. In this sense there is a direct relationship
between the advocate's moral code and divine justice.
Similar problems concerning the manner in which he presents his
client's case arise when a lawyer participates in proceedings which
resemble trials but vary in important ways from a formal adversary
proceeding in court. Examples of such proceedings are: commercial
and labor arbitration, collective bargaining, contract negotiation,
consultation and negotiation with the Treasury Department and participation in the many formal and informal proceedings before administrative agencies.
6. CuRIS, IT's YouR LAw 32 (1954).
7. Id. at 20.
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In these proceedings some of the elements of the true adversary
system may be lacking. There may be no impartial tribunal. There
may be no opponent charged with the task of direct opposition to your
case. Because of these differences, the demands on the lawyer's self
restraint, in the interest of justice, may be great.
Frequently, lawyers call upon religious faith to help them maintain
their precarious balance in this situation between the contending demands of loyalty to the client, obligation to the law as an "officer of
the court" and the responsibility of maintaining a professional independence from both client and court.
So far we have been discussing the role and problems of the lawyer
as an advocate in an adversary system. If we look at modern lawyers'
activities as a whole we can see that most of their work as a group
(and as individuals, probably) is done outside of the courtroom and
therefore not within the direct, immediate framework of the adversary system. The "office lawyer"-the prototype of the modern American lawyer-who gives legal advice concerning a proposed business
transaction or to an individual about his personal plans is, of course,
concerned with the adversary system because he realizes that his
advice may be put to the test of a trial. However, he knows that the
great majority of his arrangements will probably never be put to this
test. He is an adviser not an advocate.
What role does an "office lawyer," seeking to apply his religious
principles to his occupation, assign himself? What is the relation between divine justice, the legal system, and his job?
As "ministers of the law" some lawyers believe that their best efforts should be directed toward advising clients concerning "what the
law is." They believe the lawyer should not try to guide the client
in accordance with what he thinks the law ought to be. "Lawyers are
not the keepers of the Congressional conscience." If laws are to be
changed, the changes should come from the legislature, not from lawyers' advice to private clients, they believe.
This problem of the adviser's role in relation to the law is particularly acute in the field of taxation. There it is talked of, unhelpfully,
in terms of evasion and avoidance. Most tax lawyers say that it is
their duty to take advantage of any loopholes or imperfections in the
tax law which favor their clients. Others condemn them on moral
grounds for this attitude. A minority, some explicitly because of religious principles, view it as the tax lawyers' function to raise the
standards of tax morality, not only of their own clients, but also of the
whole society, by their advice to clients.
The difference in attitude toward the lawyer's roles reflects differences in opinion concerning the lawyer's duty to respect a higher law
than that of the existing legal system and, further, differences con-
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cerning the means of enacting and enforcing this "higher law." These
differences are probably frequently based upon the lawyer's views
concerning the existence of divine justice, the relation between that
justice and the legal system and the relation between the individual
lawyer and both justice and the legal system. Both the existence of
a religious faith and the nature of that faith would affect the character
of those views.
3. Apart from their influence on his relationship to the legal system,
the lawyer's religious principles also affect his relations with his
clients.
Although he finds no specific religious code to rely on in his attempts
to solve his client's problems, he may draw from his religion an attitude or approach to the problems. This attitude usually consists in
the attempt to view the legal matter as one aspect of the total problem
of the personality or personalities who are involved in the transaction.
If a transaction is tested for its legal validity, the lawyers will have
to follow the pattern required of him by our legal system. However, in
the absence of such a testing, he may feel that he is not limited to the
purely legal aspects of the problem nor to the role of the advocate
before a tribunal.
For example, he should, perhaps, make an attempt to handle the
client in terms of the whole man rather than in terms of his legal
problems. In this way he would be coming closer to a religious ideal
of putting his relationship with his fellow man on a basis of love and
mercy rather than justice or, particularly, legality. Of course, the
lawyer might not be competent to advise on the non-legal aspects of
the problem but this attitude would make him give thought to the
total situation.
The traditionally intimate lawyer-client relationship is a good
vehicle for this religious attitude. To the extent that the lawyerclient relationship has been weakened by modern developments in
the profession, such as specialization with its consequent fragmentation of the client's problems, and the development of large firms in
which the client's problems are spread about among many individuals,
the lawyer's opportunity to deal with the whole problem is proportionately limited.
This attitude, that religious principles require the lawyer to make the
most of his relationship with his client, to be able to act with love
and mercy towards his entire problem, is opposed to many of the
traditional standards of the profession.
These hold that the ability of the lawyer to give disinterested, and
therefore good, legal advice requires an aloof detachment from the
client. Involvement with clients, financial and personal, may mean
the loss of the distinguishing character of the professional man, his
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independence. Finally, his role in the administration of justice requires
that the advocate be kept separate from his client. He argues for him
but he is not identified with him. It is an impersonal role. That is why
barristers are kept apart from their clients and, perhaps, why they
wear wigs and gowns.
The lawyer-client relationship provides an opportunity -for the
intimate relationship in which religious principles can best be acted
upon. But taking advantage of this opportunity may destroy the lawyer's usefulness to the legal system and be harmful to the client's
purely "legal" affairs. And the trends of the profession toward specialization and combination reduce the intimacy of the lawyer-client relationship and emphasize the lawyer's concern with the legal aspects of
his client's problem.

